Morocco's Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamist-rooted party that governed Morocco for a decade, is mounting a determined comeback ahead of legislative elections scheduled for September 23, 2026 — the first since youth-led protests shook the country in late 2025. The effort to rebuild follows one of the most dramatic electoral collapses in recent Moroccan political history.

In the 2021 parliamentary elections, the PJD fell from 125 seats to just 13 in the 395-seat House of Representatives, shedding 112 seats in a single night. The party had risen to prominence after the Arab Spring-era protests of 2011, when popular demands for accountability and reform led to constitutional changes that expanded the formal powers of parliament and government — though the monarchy retained significant authority, including the power to appoint the head of government and chair the Council of Ministers, where strategic state policy is shaped. The PJD's leader, Abdelilah Benkirane, served as head of government from 2011 until 2017, when King Mohammed VI ended his mandate after Benkirane spent months unable to form a coalition. The party remained in government under a successor until the 2021 rout.

The PJD has since undergone internal reorganisation and self-examination, acknowledging that years in office had distanced the party from parts of its base. It has also pointed to what it describes as electoral corruption and disinformation as factors in its defeat — claims that represent the party's own interpretation rather than independently established findings. Benkirane, who reclaimed the party's leadership, remains one of Morocco's most recognisable political figures, and party officials describe his return as an asset — though they acknowledge that personal visibility alone will not restore lost seats. The party's 2026 programme comprises 467 measures covering identity and family, institutional reform, public services, the economy and foreign policy, with a particular focus on jobs, purchasing power, healthcare, education and anti-corruption measures. Party youth officials have emphasised the need to engage younger Moroccans as active participants rather than passive voters.

One persistent tension shadows the PJD's return. Benkirane has long spoken of "ghosts and crocodiles" — a metaphor for powerful or hidden interests that he says constrained his governments — and his party explicitly opposes Morocco's normalisation with Israel, which was agreed in 2020 while a PJD-led government was in office. In September 2026, Morocco and Israel moved to elevate their diplomatic missions to embassy level; the PJD reaffirmed its opposition the following day. The party has made clear it seeks change from within the existing constitutional framework and does not challenge the monarchy's central role, but the gap between its stated positions and the policies pursued during its own time in power remains a question voters and analysts are watching.

The broader electoral landscape is competitive. The Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM, from the French "Parti authenticité et modernité"), a secular-leaning rival, is campaigning actively, with senior figures visiting cities including Rabat and focusing on the high cost of living — a concern shared across party lines. The election takes place as Morocco prepares to co-host the 2030 FIFA World Cup alongside Spain and Portugal, a backdrop that raises expectations around economic management, employment and public infrastructure. For the PJD, the September vote is both an opportunity to demonstrate recovery and a test of whether internal renewal has produced something voters are willing to trust again.